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Abstract—We consider a cognitive wireless powered com-
munication network (CWPCN) sharing the spectrum with a
primary network who faces security threats from eavesdroppers
(EAVs). We propose a new cooperative protocol for the wireless
powered secondary users (SU) to cooperate with the primary
user (PU). In the protocol, the SUs first harvest energy from
the power signals transmitted by the cognitive hybrid access
point during the wireless power transfer (WPT) phase, and then
use the harvested energy to interfere with the EAVs and gain
transmission opportunities at the same time during the wireless
information transfer (WIT) phase. Taking the maximization of
the SU ergodic rate as the design objective, resource allocation
algorithms based on the dual optimization method and the
block coordinate descent method are proposed for the cases
of perfect channel state information (CSI) and collusive/non-
collusive EAVs under the PU secrecy constraint. More PU
favorable greedy algorithms aimed at minimizing the PU secrecy
outage probability are also proposed. We furthermore consider
the unknown EAVs’ CSI case and propose an efficient algorithm
to improve the PU security performance. Extensive simulations
show that our proposed protocol and corresponding resource
allocation algorithms can not only let the SU gain transmission
opportunities but also improve the PU security performance even
with unknown EAVs’ CSI.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, resource allocation, wireless
powered communication, eavesdropping, cooperation
I. INTRODUCTION
COGNITIVE radio (CR) has been widely studied in re-cent years due to its capability of improving spectrum
utilization [1]. In CR networks, there are two kinds of users,
one is called secondary user (SU) who does not have its own
spectrum, and the other one is called primary user (PU) who
owns licensed spectrum. Basically, there are three main CR
paradigms for the SU to utilize the spectrum licensed to the
PU: interweave, underlay and overlay [2]. In interweave CR
networks, the SU must sense the spectrum status and utilize the
spectrum when the spectrum is sensed as vacant. In underlay
CR networks, the SU can utilize the spectrum as long as the
interference caused to the PU is acceptable for the PU. These
two CR paradigms do not provide incentives for the PU to
allow the SU to utilize its spectrum. In contrast to interweave
and underlay CR networks, in overlay CR networks, the
transmission of the PU is facilitated from the cooperation from
Ding Xu is with the Wireless Communication Key Lab of Jiangsu Province,
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210003, China
(e-mail: xuding@ieee.org). Qun Li is with the Jiangsu Key Lab of Big
Data Security and Intelligent Processing, Nanjing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, Nanjing 210046, China. (e-mail: liqun@njupt.edu.cn).
the SU. By doing so, the PU has motivation for allowing the
SU to utilize the licensed spectrum.
Security is an important requirement for wireless networks,
and there is no exception for the PU networks. In particular,
we are interested in one kind of security threats to the PU
networks, i.e., eavesdropping from malicious users who try to
decode messages broadcasted from the PU. In this context,
secrecy rate [3], [4], defined as the achievable non-negative
rate of the perfectly secure information sent from the source to
the destination with the presence of the eavesdroppers (EAVs),
is usually adopted to measure the physical-layer security
performance. However, only zero or trivial secrecy rate can
be achieved by the PU when the source-to-EAV channel is
strong. Generally, the SU can act as a cooperative relay or a
friendly jammer to improve the PU security performance [5].
Meanwhile, wireless power transfer (WPT) has greet po-
tential to become a perpetual energy source for wireless
equipments by harvesting ambient radio signals [6], [7]. For
example, a power station transmitting tens of watts can support
maximum WPT distance in the range of meter for
powering smart phones and tablet computers [8]. Thus, wire-
less powered communication networks (WPCNs), in which
wireless equipments are powered by WPT, have received a lot
of attention . A typical transmission protocol for the WPCNs
is the so-called “harvest-then-transmit” protocol [9], where
in each transmission time block, users first harvest energy
during the WPT phase and then transmit information during
the wireless information transfer (WIT) phase. As for cognitive
WPCNs (CWPCNs), in which the SU or the PU is wireless
powered, one has to optimize the time and power allocation
for maximizing the SU performance while also restricting the
interference to the PU or improving the PU performance [10]–
[12].
For CWPCNs, by allowing a portion of time exclusively
for the wireless powered SU to harvest energy from RF
signals, the SU can then act as a friendly jammer to improve
the PU security performance and gain its own transmission
opportunity simultaneously during the remaining portion of
time. By doing so, since the PU security performance is
improved, the PU has incentive to let the SU harvest energy
and transmit information on its licensed spectrum band. Such
cooperation leads to a win-win situation for both the CR
networks and the PU networks. This motivates the work in
this paper.
In this paper, we propose a new protocol for a CWPCN
to cooperate with a PU network who faces security threats
2from EAVs. In the proposed protocol, the SUs first harvest
energy from the power signals transmitted by a half-duplex
cognitive hybrid access point (CHAP) during the WPT phase,
and then by using the harvested energy, at most one SU is
scheduled to transmit information to the CHAP while the other
SUs are sending artificial noise to interfere with the EAVs to
improve the PU security performance during the WIT phase.
The CHAP is responsible for transmitting energy wirelessly
to the SU in the downlink and receiving information from the
SU in the uplink. For those SUs far from the CHAP and very
close to the PU transmitter, the PU transmitter can also decide
to broadcast energy to these SUs during the WPT phase. It is
assumed that the PU has no knowledge of the channel state
information (CSI) related to the EAVs and thus transmits at a
constant secrecy rate. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability
is adopted as a performance metric for the PU. To encourage
the PU to cooperate with the SU, we introduce a new constraint
named as the PU secrecy constraint, which requires that the
PU secrecy outage probability with the cooperation from the
SU shall be lowered to a desired target threshold compared to
the case without the cooperation.
Our goal is to maximize the SU ergodic rate by opti-
mizing SU scheduling, power and time allocation under the
PU secrecy constraint. Compared to the work such as [5],
[13] that considered the SUs are powered by conventional
energy sources, the investigated problem in this paper is more
intractable due to the fact that the transmit power of the SU
depends on the time allocated for the WPT phase and the
power allocation of the PU, which makes the optimization
variables coupled together and hard to be optimized. We first
consider the case when perfect CSI is available at the SUs
and the EAVs are not collusive. In this case, by deriving some
important properties of the optimal solution, the optimization
problem is simplified and an algorithm based on the dual
optimization method and the block coordinate descent (BCD)
method is proposed to address the problem. We then extend
the work to consider the case when the EAVs are collusive.
Besides, aiming at minimizing the PU secrecy outage proba-
bility, more PU favorable greedy algorithms are also proposed.
Furthermore, we also consider the case when the CSI related
to the EAVs is unknown to the SUs and propose an efficient
algorithm to improve the PU security performance. Extensive
simulation results confirm the effectiveness of our proposed
CWPCN protocol and corresponding resource allocation algo-
rithms.
It is noted that using wireless powered SUs to improve the
PU security performance is appealing due to the following
considerations: 1) Since the SU is wirelessly powered, there is
no need to replace the exhausted battery and thus the lifetime
of the SU is theoretically infinite; 2) Since no battery is
needed for the SU, the size of the SU equipment can be small.
Thus, the deployment of the SU is flexible and will not get
attention by the EAVs. It is also noted that the shortcoming of
low available transmit power of the SU can be overcame by
deploying the SUs close to the CHAP or the PU transmitter,
while the effect of interfering to the EAVs can be improved
by increasing the number of SUs and deploying the SUs close
to the EAVs.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
We propose a new cooperative protocol for the CWPCN
to coexist with the PU network and improve the PU
security performance, where the wireless powered SUs
first harvest energy, and then at most one SU is scheduled
to transmit information while the remaining SUs are
sending artificial noise to interfere with the EAVs to
improve the PU security performance.
With the proposed protocol, we first consider the case
when perfect CSI is available at the SUs and the EAVs
are not collusive, and maximize the SU ergodic rate
under the PU secrecy constraint by jointly optimizing SU
scheduling, power and time allocation. The optimization
problem is shown to be highly non-convex, and we
propose a suboptimal algorithm by applying the dual
optimization method and the BCD method.
We then extend the work to consider the case when the
EAVs are collusive. Besides, more PU favorable greedy
algorithms are also proposed aiming at minimizing the
PU secrecy outage probability. For the more practical case
when the CSI related to the EAVs is unknown to the SUs,
we furthermore propose an efficient algorithm for the SUs
to improve the PU security performance.
Extensive simulation results reveal interesting phe-
nomenons such as increasing the number of EAVs actu-
ally improves the SU performance while it degrades the
PU security performance, and compared to non-collusive
EAVs, collusive EAVs are actually more beneficial to the
SUs while they are more harmful to the PU. Besides, it
is shown that with unknown EAVs’ CSI, the PU security
performance can still be improved significantly at the
sacrifice of the SU performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The work related
to this paper is described in Section II. Section III presents the
system model and formulates the optimization problem. Sec-
tion IV proposes the resource allocation algorithm for the case
of perfect CSI with non-collusive EAVs. Section V extends the
work to consider the case of collusive EAVs, proposes greedy
algorithms to minimize the PU secrecy outage probability,
and furthermore considers the more practical unknown EAVs’
CSI case. Section VI verifies the proposed algorithms with
extensive simulation results. Finally, Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The PU security performance with the cooperation of the
SU was investigated in [5], [13]–[19]. Specifically, in [5], the
resource allocation problem to maximize the SU ergodic rate
under the condition that the PU secrecy outage probability
does not deteriorate due to the existence of the SU was inves-
tigated. In [13], besides the PU, the SU was also considered
to be threatened by the EAVs, and the SU ergodic secrecy
rate was maximized with imperfect CSI under the PU secrecy
outage constraint. In [14], the SU secrecy rate was maximized
by optimizing power allocation, time allocation and relay
selection subject to the minimum PU secrecy rate constraint
3for both perfect and imperfect CSI. In [15], the SU was
proposed to interfere with the EAV and the PU secrecy outage
probability was derived in closed-form with fixed values of the
SU configuration parameters such as transmit power. In [16],
the transmit power of the SU was minimized under different
SINR constraints at the EAV, the PU and the SU. In [17],
the PU secrecy rate and the SU secrecy rate were optimized
based on Stackelberg game. In [18], the power allocation
problem to maximize the SU rate under the zero PU secrecy
rate loss requirement was investigated. In [19], the close-form
expressions of ergodic PU secrecy rate were analyzed with
different SU selection schemes. Note that, unlike this paper,
the above references [5], [13]–[19] all assumed that the SU is
equipped with constant energy supplies.
The physical-layer security in WPCNs has been investigated
in [20]–[26]. In [20], the source node was assumed to harvest
energy from the base station and use these energy for interfer-
ing with the EAVs, and the secrecy throughput was maximized
under the secrecy constraint and the transmit power constraint.
In [21], a simple communication protocol for secure commu-
nications with the help from a wireless powered jammer was
proposed and the secrecy throughput was maximized. In [22],
a two-phase protocol, where the destination node was assumed
to harvest energy from the source node in the first phase
and then use these energy to interfere with the EAVs in the
second phase, was proposed and the secrecy energy efficiency
was maximize by optimizing the time allocation and the
power allocation. In [23], by considering both the minimum
secrecy rate requirement and the minimum harvested energy
requirement, the secrecy energy efficiency was maximized by
optimizing power allocation and power splitting ratio. In [24],
a WPCN with a wireless powered jammer was considered, and
the time allocation was optimized to maximize the secrecy rate
and minimize the secrecy outage probability. In [25], a WPCN
with a wireless powered jammer and an energy receiver who
is a potential EAV was considered, and the power allocation at
the source node and the jammer to maximize the secrecy rate
was optimized. In [26], a multicarrier WPCN with a wireless
powered jammer was considered, and the secrecy rate was
maximized by jointly optimizing time allocation and power
allocation at the source node and the jammer over subcarriers.
Note that, compared to these works on security in WPCNs in
[20]–[26], our problem is different due to the need to improve
the PU security performance as well as providing transmission
opportunities for the SU.
As for the physical-layer security in CWPCNs, some recent
work focused on investigating secure communications for the
SU, such as [27]–[32]. In [27], the secrecy outage probability
of the SU was derived in closed-form under the interference
power constraint at the PU. In [28], multiple design objectives
for the SU were considered under the secrecy performance
guarantee at the SU and the interference power constraint at
the PU. In [29], the PU was assumed to be a potential EAV
for the SU and the SU transmit power was minimized under
the minimum SU secrecy rate and the minimum harvested
energy constraints. In [30], under the interference power
constraint at the PU and assuming that the secondary receiver
is full-duplex and sends jamming signals to the EAV, the
probability of strictly positive secrecy rate at the SU was
investigated. In [31], the SU secrecy rate was improved by
letting a wireless powered jammer to degrade the performance
of the EAV. In [32], a SU scheduling scheme was proposed
for a CWPCN with the interference power constraint at the
PU, and its closed-form expressions of outage probability
and intercept probability were derived over Rayleigh fading
channels. Compared to these related works in [27]–[32] , our
work is different in that secure communications for the PU is
our concern.
The work in [33]–[37] considered PU security in CWPCNs.
In [33]–[35], the SU was assumed to harvest energy from the
environment or the PU signals and then relay PU messages
to enhance PU secrecy performance. Note that [33]–[35]
considered only one pair of SUs and the proposed schemes can
improve PU secrecy performance only if the SU is far from
the EAV. In [36], the wireless powered SU was considered as
a potential EAV for the PU and the SU rate was maximized
under the SINR constraints at the PU and the SU. In [37],
the secrecy guard zones were set by the primary network to
protect itself from eavesdropping from the wireless powered
secondary network. It is noted that the SU was considered as
a potential EAV in [36], [37], while this paper treats the SU as
a friendly jammer for the PU. To our best knowledge, no work
in existing literature has considered to use wireless powered
SUs to act as friendly jammers to improve the PU security
performance and gain their own transmission opportunities at
the same time.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Figure 1. System model.
We consider an uplink CWPCN with SUs and one CHAP
sharing the narrow spectrum band with one pair of PUs (a
primary transmitter (PTx) and a primary receiver (PRx)) who
faces security threats from EAVs, as shown in Fig. 1. Let
and denote the sets of SUs and EAVs, respectively. It
is assumed that the SUs are powered only by the energy
harvested from RF signals while the rest nodes are powered
by constant energy sources. All the channels involved are
assumed to be block fading, i.e., all the channel power gains
are constant within a transmission block and may change
independently from one block to another. The channel power
gains between SU and the CHAP, from SU
to the PRx, from SU to EAV , from the PTx
to the PRx, from the PTx to SU , from the PTx to
the CHAP, and from the PTx to EAV are denoted by
, , , , , , and
4respectively, where denotes the joint fading state for all the
channels involved. It is assumed that the PU has no knowledge
on the CSI of the links related to the EAVs and thus transmits
at a constant secrecy rate . As for the SUs’ knowledge on
the CSI, two cases are considered. In the first case, the CSI
is assumed to be perfectly available at the SUs. In the second
case, the CSI of the links involving the EAVs is assumed to
be unavailable while the other CSI is assumed to be perfectly
known at the SUs1. It is noted that although perfect CSI is
hard to be realized in practice, it can be served as an upper
bound or a benchmark for imperfect CSI. Investigating the
perfect CSI case can let us know the potential benefits of such
cooperation between the SU and the PU and guide the design
of the imperfect CSI case.
For each transmission block, without loss of generality, the
time is assumed to be unit. The unit time is assumed to
be divided into two phases: the WPT phase and the WIT
phase. In the first WPT phase with time duration the
CHAP and the PTx broadcast RF energy to the SUs, and
meanwhile the SUs harvest energy from these RF signals
and then store the energy in supercapacitors. Compared to
rechargeable batteries, supercapacitors have smaller form-
factor, faster charging cycle and longer life [39]. However,
energy leakage for a supercapacitor is very large [40] and
thus the energy might not be able to be stored long enough
for the next transmission block. For simplicity, similar to [41],
we assume that the harvested energy in current transmission
block cannot be used for future transmission blocks. In the
second WIT phase with time duration , the PTx transmits
information to the PRx, and meanwhile at most one SU is
scheduled to transmit information to the CHAP and the other
SUs are sending artificial noise to interfere with the EAVs.
Supposing that the cooperation from the SU is not available
and all the time within each transmission block are used by
the PU for information transmission with maximum transmit
power , then the achievable rate at the PU and the EAV
at fading state can be written as [5]
(1)
and
(2)
respectively, where is the noise power. Then, if the EAVs
are non-collusive, the maximum secrecy rate of the PU is [5]
(3)
where denotes . If the EAVs are collusive and
use maximum ratio combining, the achievable rate at the EAVs
is given as [42]
(4)
1Note that the effects of the imperfect CSI of the links not involving EAVs
(such as the links between the SUs and the CHAP, and the links between the
SUs and the PU) have been well researched in existing literature such as [38].
Thus, we focus on our main contributions of this paper and consider the CSI
of the links related to the EAVs is unknown.
and the maximum secrecy rate of the PU is given as [42]
(5)
Since the PU transmits at a constant secrecy rate , the PU se-
crecy outage probability is given by .
Note that, is a known value if and the distribution
of and are given.
Now, supposing that the SU cooperates with the PU. In this
case, the CHAP transmits RF energy with constant power
during WPT. In addition, the PTx transmits RF energy with
power duringWPT and transmits information with power
during WIT at fading state . Note that can be
equal to zero and this means the PTx will not transfer energy
to the SUs. The energy harvested by SU during WPT
is where ( ) is
the energy harvesting efficiency2. The energy consumed by
SU during WIT cannot be higher than that harvested
during WPT. Let and denote the transmit powers
of SU for information transmission and jamming during
WIT at fading state , respectively. Then, we have
Since each SU
is scheduled either for information transmission or jamming
and at most one SU is scheduled for information transmission,
we have for all and
Similar to the existing work such as [14], [15],
we assume that the PU and the EAVs treat the information
signals from the SU as interference. We also assume that the
artificial noise sent from the SUs can be canceled at the PU
and the CHAP but cannot be canceled at the EAVs. Such
assumption can be practically realized by the method proposed
in [44]: the SUs, the CHAP and the PU pre-store a set of
Gaussian distributed random sequences used for artificial noise
with the indices of the sequences treated as the keys. The
SU randomly select a sequence and send its key secretly to
the CHAP and the PU using the phase-shift modulation-based
method proposed in [45]. Since the set of random sequences
is unknown to the EAVs, the EAVs cannot know the sequence
used by the SU even if the key is intercepted by the EAVs.
Then, with SUs’ cooperation, the achievable rate at the PU
and the EAV at fading state can be written as
(6)
and
(7)
respectively. Supposing that the EAVs are non-collusive, the
maximum secrecy rate of the PU with SUs’ cooperation at
fading state is
(8)
2Note that the energy harvesting efficiency achieved by commercial prod-
ucts can be as high as [43].
5Supposing that the EAVs are collusive and use maximum ratio
combining, the achievable rate at the EAVs is given as
(9)
and the maximum secrecy rate of the PU is given as
(10)
It is noted that scheduling the SU near the PRx for information
transmission will cause severe interference to the PRx. Thus
through proper SU scheduling, the SU who causes minor
interference to the PRx shall be scheduled for information
transmission. If such SU does not exist, no SU shall be
scheduled for information transmission.
The PU secrecy outage probability with the cooperation
from the SU is written as To
encourage the PU to cooperate with the SU, the PU secrecy
outage probability is required to be lower than that without
the SU’s cooperation, i.e.,
(11)
where ( ) denotes the required PU secrecy outage
probability reduction3. We denote the above constraint as the
PU secrecy constraint.
We aim to optimize SU scheduling, power and time alloca-
tion to maximize the SU ergodic rate as4 (P1)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
In P1, the objective function in (12) is the SU ergodic rate
defined as the rate averaged over all transmission fading
blocks. Here, we assume that the SU carries delay-tolerant
services. Such assumption is reasonable as the SU transmis-
sion is opportunistic and thus stringent transmission delay
requirement for the SU is improper. Since ergodic rate can
3In this paper, we assume that the PU always has data to transmit/receive.
In such a case, the PU can cooperate with the SU to improve its own secrecy
performance as enforced by the constraint in (11). For the case when the
PU has no data to transmit/receive, the SU can occupy the spectrum freely
or being charged with a price. The interested readers may refer to [46] and
references therein for the work on pricing-based methods dealing with the
case when the PU is willing to lease its unused spectrum to the SU.
4Hereafter, we omit the index for the fading state wherever it is clear
from the context.
be considered as the average rate under no transmission delay
requirement, we adopt ergodic rate as our performance metric
for the SU. The constraint in (13) is used to restrict the transmit
powers of the PU in the WPT and WIT phases such that the
average transmit power over the two phases is below .
The constraint in (13) is also used for a fair comparison with
the case without SU’s cooperation. Since unit transmission
block is assumed, the constraint in (13) can also be interpreted
as a constraint to restrict the total energy consumed by the
PU in the two phases. The constraint in (14) indicates that
the total time length of the two phases must be no larger than
. The constraint in (15) indicates that the energy consumed
by the SU during WIT must be no larger than the energy
harvested during WPT. The constraint in (16) indicates that
each SU is scheduled either for information transmission or
jamming. The constraint in (17) indicates that at most one SU
is scheduled for information transmission. The constraint in
(18) is the PU secrecy constraint used to encourage the PU to
cooperate with the SU such that the PU secrecy performance
in terms of secrecy outage probability can be improved by the
cooperation from the SU. It is noted that the value of should
be not too small (i.e., should be not too large), otherwise
P1 will be infeasible. Here, we assume that the value of
is small enough such that P1 is feasible5.
IV. RESOURCE ALLOCATION ALGORITHM WITH PERFECT
CSI AND NON-COLLUSIVE EAVS
This section considers the case of perfect CSI and non-
collusive EAVs for P1. To our best knowledge, P1 is a highly
non-linear non-convex problem that cannot be solved directly
with standard method. To solve P1, we first derive some
properties of the optimal solution to P1, and then we simplify
P1 using these properties.
Proposition 1: The optimal solution to P1 must satisfy the
constraint in (13) with strict equality, i.e.,
Proof : Please refer to Appendix A.
Proposition 2: The optimal solution to P1 can always satisfy
the constraint in (14) with strict equality, i.e.,
Proof : Please refer to Appendix B.
Based on Propositions 1-2, we have the following rela-
tionships between the optimization variables for the optimal
solution to P1 as
(20)
Inserting the above expressions into P1, P1 is reduced to the
5It is noted that the greedy algorithms proposed in Section V-B can be
used to check the feasibility of P1. As long as in the greedy algorithm
is very large, the obtained PU secrecy outage probability is practically the
smallest PU secrecy outage probability that can be achieved by cooperation
from the SU. Thus, if the PU secrecy outage probability obtained from the
greedy algorithm is larger than , then P1 is infeasible, and otherwise, P1
is feasible.
6following problem as (P2)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
and constraints (16)-(18)
To solve P2, we introduce a virtual SU indexed by
and schedule it for information transmission if all the actual
SUs are scheduled for jamming. The channel power gains
related to this virtual SU are set to zero. In what follows, we
assume that SU is included in the SU set . The following
indicator function is introduced as
(26)
Then, the constraint (18) can be rewritten as
(27)
It is observed that P2 is still highly non-convex and hard to
be solved with standard methods. In the following, we solve
P2 with the dual optimization method [47] and the block
coordinate descent (BCD) method [48].
It is seen that the optimization variables for all the channel
fading states are coupled in constraint (27). Thus, it makes
sense to adopt dual decomposition by forming the Lagrangian
function to relax the coupling constraint (27) as given by [47]
(28)
where is the dual variable associated with the constraint (27).
Then, the Lagrange dual function is written as [47]
(29)
constraints (16) (17) (22) (25)
Using (28), we can rewrite the above problem as
where
(30)
constraints (16) (17) (22) (25)
Thus, through the dual decomposition, P2 is separated into
two levels of optimization. At the lower level, we have the
subproblems, one for each channel fading state as given by
the problem in (30). At the higher level, we have the master
dual problem written as The optimal solution
obtained from the two levels of optimization is the optimal
solution of P2 if the duality gap is zero [47], otherwise, the
solution is a feasible solution of P2. Luckily, it has been shown
in [49] that the time-sharing condition is satisfied if the channel
power gain distributions are continuous for a problem similar
to P2, and the duality gap is zero by satisfying the time-
sharing condition. Therefore, adopting the dual optimization
is appropriate for P2. Since the master dual problem can be
easily solved by updating via the subgradient method until
convergence [47], we focus on solving the problem in (30) in
what follows.
Since the problem in (30) is nonconvex, the optimal solution
is computationally difficult to derive. Instead, we adopt the
BCD method to obtain a suboptimal solution by iteratively
optimizing with given optimizing with
given and optimizing with given
until convergence. Firstly, with given the
value of is optimized as
(31)
(32)
Since increases as increases if is nonzero or
keeps unchanged as increases if is zero, the indicator
function may decrease from to or
remain unchanged as increases. Thus, the objective function
in (31) is maximized at the maximum allowable given by
(33)
Next, with given the value of is optimized
as
(34)
(35)
where
Let
. It is easily
seen that is a monotonically decreasing function of .
It is noted that the objective function in (34) now becomes
From (26), if ,
we have From (6)-(8), we can
reformulate the inequality as a set of inequalities
7given by where
(36)
The following indicator function is then introduced as
(37)
Based on the above reformulation, we can rewrite
as
Then, the problem in
(34) is reformulated as
(38)
(39)
Based on the above reformulation of the problem in (34), its
solution can be obtained by first deriving optimal ’s, one
for each of the inner maximization problems in (38), and then
picking the one that minimizes the objective function in (38).
The following theorem presents the optimal solution to the
problem in (38).
Theorem 1: The optimal solution to the problem in (38)
is given by where
and is given by
(40)
and
Proof : Please refer to Appendix C.
Then, with given , the value of is optimized
as
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
Since only one SU can be scheduled for information trans-
mission, i.e., only one can be nonzero, we can solve
the problem in (41) by first deriving optimal power
allocations, one for each of the total SUs, and then
selecting the one that maximizes the objective function in
(41). Assuming that SU is scheduled for information
transmission, i.e., , then the secrecy
rate of the PU becomes
(46)
and constraint (44) is rewritten as
(47)
(48)
where
(49)
(50)
Clearly, in (46) is a non-decreasing function of . Thus,
the transmit power of the SU scheduled for jamming can be
set to its maximum allowable value, i.e., , in
order to decrease the PU secrecy outage probability as low as
possible. Therefore, assuming that SU is scheduled for
information transmission, the problem in (41) is simplified as
(51)
(52)
where
(53)
and
(54)
Let . It is easily seen that
is a monotonically increasing function of . It is noted
that the objective function in (51) now becomes
From (54), the inequality can be rewritten
as a set of inequalities given by where
(55)
Then, we can rewrite as
where
(56)
8Then, the problem in (51) can be rewritten as
(57)
(58)
Therefore, the problem in (51) can be solved by first solving
the inner maximization problem in (57) for each and
then selecting the one that minimizes the objective function in
(57). The following theorem presents the optimal solution to
the problem in (57).
Theorem 2: The optimal solution to the problem in (57) is
given by where is given by
(59)
and
(60)
(61)
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
Proof : Please refer to Appendix D.
Once is obtained for each by searching over all
possible SU schedulings, the solution to the problem in
(41) is the one that maximizes the objective function in (51).
The index of the SU scheduled for information transmission
is obtained as , and we
then have obtained from Theorem and
Note that if , then all the SUs are
scheduled for jamming.
The proposed algorithm based on the dual optimization
method and the BCD method is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1: The complexity of Algorithm 1 is analyzed as
follows. Since the subgradient method used to update is
Algorithm 1 Proposed joint SU scheduling, power and time
allocation algorithm based on the dual optimization method
and the BCD method.
1: Initialize , , and
.
2: repeat
3: For each channel fading state, do the following steps
4-12.
4: Initialize ,
5: repeat
6: for all such that do
7: For all , calculate from (59).
8: Calculate from (60) and obtain .
9: end for
10: Calculate as ,
and let for all .
11: Obtain from (33), and then obtain according to
Theorem .
12: until improvement of the objective function value in
(30) converges to a prescribed accuracy.
13: Update
14:
15: until
where is the accuracy, is a sequence of step sizes.
polynomial in the number of dual variables [47], its complexity
is . In each iteration of obtaining , , and
requires calculations, where is the number
of iterations for the BCD method to converge. Thus, the total
complexity of Algorithm 1 is which is linear in
the number of SUs and the number of EAVs.
V. EXTENSIONS
A. Collusive EAVs
Here, we consider the EAVs are collusive and perfect
CSI is available at the SUs. The case of unknown EAVs’
CSI is discussed in Section V-C. It can be noted that the
summation term in (9) makes the problem highly intractable.
For this, considering the fact that at most one is nonzero,
a lower bound on in (10) denoted as is proposed
by ignoring the interference term in the second
part of (9). Using , the PU secrecy outage probability
is an upper bound on and thus the
PU secrecy constraint in (11) must be satisfied if
holds. By following the procedures used in Section IV, P1
with collusive EAVs can be solved with an algorithm similar
to Algorithm 1. The details are omitted here due to page limit.
B. Greedy Algorithms
In this subsection, we consider that the PU is greedy and
requires the cooperative SUs to minimize the PU secrecy
outage probability with perfect CSI available at the SUs. Based
on this motivation, we formulate the optimization problem as
9(P3)
(66)
(13) (17) (19)
where the value of is a very large positive number. The
second part of the objective function in (66) is introduced as
a penalty function for punishing causing secrecy outage to the
PU. It can be verified that Propositions 1-2 still hold for P3.
Based on Propositions 1-2 and using the indicator function in
(26), P3 can be reformulated and then decoupled into parallel
subproblems with the same structure, each for one fading state
as given by the problem in (30). Thus, using the BCD method
adopted in Section IV, the solution for the case of perfect CSI
with non-collusive EAVs can be obtained. As for the case of
collusive EAVs, the method proposed in Sections V-A can be
used to solve the problem. We omit the details here for brevity.
C. Unknown EAVs’ CSI
Here, this subsection investigates the unknown EAVs’ CSI
case. We assume that the instantaneous values as well as
the distribution information of and are unknown.
In such a case, it is impossible to theoretically guarantee the
PU secrecy constraint in (11). Instead, we design an efficient
algorithm that can decrease the PU secrecy outage probability
as much as possible in what follows. Firstly, in order to let
the PU achieve a higher secrecy rate, the value of is set
to zero and the value of is set to its maximum allowable
value . Secondly, in order to let the SU achieve a satisfac-
tory performance, the SU with the maximum communication
channel power gain to the CHAP is scheduled for information
transmission in the WIT phase, i.e.,
where . Thirdly, in order to interfere
with the EAVs to the most extent, the transmit power of the
SU scheduled for jamming is set to the maximum allowable
power, i.e., for all . Then, the remaining
variables are optimized to maximize the SU rate
given by
(67)
(68)
(69)
It can be verified that the optimal solution to the problem in
(67) satisfies . It is proved briefly here. Suppose that
the optimal solution satisfies . Then, the value of
can be increased to satisfy and such solution
provides the same objective function value and satisfies the
constraints. Thus, the optimal solution shall use up all the
available time. It can be also verified that the optimal solution
to the problem in (67) satisfies otherwise,
we can increase to get a higher objective function value.
Based on the above analysis, we have and
. Then, the problem in (67) reduces to
the following problem as
(70)
It can be verified that the above problem is non-linear and
non-convex. Since is restricted in the narrow interval ,
we can apply a one-dimensional search algorithm (such as
the fminbnd function in MATLAB) within the interval
to find the optimal . The overall algorithm with unknown
EAVs’ CSI is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Proposed algorithm with unknown EAVs’ CSI.
1: Obtain as .
2: Obtain by solving the problem in (70) via one-
dimensional search algorithms and let .
3: Let
and for all
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithms by Monte Carlo simulations. When performing
simulations, the PTx is located at the center, the PRx is
randomly deployed in a ring with inner radius meter and
outer radius meter, while the CHAP, the SUs and the EAVs
are randomly deployed in a ring with inner radius meter and
outer radius meter. The channel power gains are modeled
as where represents the large-scale pathloss
modeled as dB with denoting the distance,
and is the normalized small-scale fading with exponential
distribution. Besides, we set , bits/s/Hz,
dBW, dBW and dBW. For the
purpose of comparison, a benchmark algorithm without SU’s
cooperation is considered. The benchmark algorithm assumes
that the PRx is wireless powered and supports full-duplex
communication, and thus the PRx can send jamming signals to
the EAV using the harvested energy by power splitting, similar
to the one proposed in [30].
Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b show the SU ergodic rate and the PU
secrecy outage probability against the required PU secrecy out-
age probability reduction , respectively. Since the greedy
algorithm does not apply the PU secrecy constraint, the value
of has no impact on the SU ergodic rate and the PU se-
crecy outage probability achieved by the greedy algorithm. It is
shown that, as increases, the SU ergodic rate and the PU
secrecy outage probability achieved by Algorithm 1 decrease
and are higher than that achieved by the greedy algorithm.
This is because that when dealing with the PU secrecy outage
probability, Algorithm 1 aims to guarantee the reduction of
the PU secrecy outage probability, while the greedy algorithm
aims to minimize the PU secrecy outage probability. It is also
shown that the greedy algorithm achieves significantly lower
PU secrecy outage probability than the benchmark algorithm,
and Algorithm 1 outperforms the benchmark algorithm if
is not too small and their performance gap increases as
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Figure 2. Performance against the secrecy outage probability reduction ( ).
increases. As expected, it is seen that the PU secrecy outage
probability with collusive EAVs is higher than that with non-
collusive EAVs. It is interesting to observe that the SU ergodic
rate with collusive EAVs is higher than that with non-colllusive
EAVs. This can be explained as follows. Since the PU secrecy
outage probability with collusive EAVs is higher than that
with non-colllusive EAVs, the SU will have more flexibility in
cooperation with the PU for decreasing the PU secrecy outage
probability. This indicates that it is beneficial to the SUs if the
EAVs are collusive.
Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b show the SU ergodic rate and the PU
secrecy outage probability against the number of SUs ,
respectively. It is shown that, with the increase of , the
SU ergodic rates achieved by Algorithm 1 and the greedy
algorithm increase. This indicates that increasing the value of
is beneficial to the SUs for both Algorithm 1 and the greedy
algorithm. This is because that by increasing the number of
SUs, there is a much better chance that the scheduled SU
has more harvested energy and better channel conditions to
achieve a higher rate. It is also shown that, with the increase of
, the PU secrecy outage probability achieved by Algorithm
1 keeps constant, while the PU secrecy outage probability
achieved by the greedy algorithm decreases. This indicates
that increasing the value of is beneficial to the PU only
for the greedy algorithm. The above differences between the
two algorithms lie in the fact that the aim of Algorithm 1 is
to maximize the SU ergodic rate with guaranteed reduction of
the PU secrecy outage probability while the aim of the greedy
algorithm is to minimize the PU secrecy outage probability.
Besides, it is shown that both Algorithm 1 and the greedy
algorithm outperform the benchmark algorithm in terms of
PU secrecy outage probability, and the gap between the greedy
algorithm and the benchmark algorithm increases greatly as
increases.
Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b show the SU ergodic rate and the PU
secrecy outage probability against the number of EAVs , re-
spectively. It is shown that the PU secrecy outage probabilities
achieved by Algorithm 1 and the greedy algorithm increase as
increases. This is as expected since more EAVs leads to
lower PU secrecy rate that can be achieved as observed from
(8) and (10). It is also shown that with the increase of ,
the SU ergodic rates achieved by both Algorithm 1 and the
greedy algorithm increases. This indicates that a larger number
of EAVs is actually beneficial to the SUs for both algorithms.
This can be explained as follows. Since a larger leads to
a higher PU secrecy outage probability, this can let the SUs
cooperate with the PUs more flexibly and give the SUs more
opportunities to achieve a higher SU ergodic rate.
Next, we investigate the performance of the proposed al-
gorithm with unknown EAVs’ CSI. Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b show
the SU ergodic rate and the PU secrecy outage probability
with unknown EAVs’ CSI against the number of SUs ,
respectively. By comparing Fig. 5a with Fig. 3a, it is seen
that the SU ergodic rate with unknown EAVs’ CSI drops
significantly compared to the one with perfect CSI. From Fig.
5b, it is shown that the PU secrecy outage probability achieved
by the proposed algorithm with unknown EAVs’ CSI decreases
as increases and is lower than that without SU when is
not small. This indicates that as long as is sufficiently large,
the PU security performance can be improved significantly
even without knowlwdge of EAVs’ CSI. Further in Fig. 6,
we show the PU secrecy outage probability with unknown
EAVs’ CSI against the number of EAVs . Note that, since
the proposed algorithm with unknown EAVs’ CSI does not
depends on any information on EAVs, the achieved SU ergodic
rate is constant as changes. It is shown that the PU secrecy
outage probability achieved by the proposed algorithm with
unknown EAVs’ CSI increases as increases and is largerly
lower than that without SU. From Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we
conclude that with unknown EAVs’ CSI, the SU performance
is greatly degraded while the PU security performance can still
be improved largely by the proposed algorithm.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a new cooperative protocol for the
CWPCN to cooperate with the PU to improve the security
performance of the PU who faces security threats from EAVs.
In the protocol, the SUs first harvest energy and then use the
harvested energy to interfere with the EAVs and gain their own
transmission opportunities at the same time. Assuming that the
CSI is perfect and the EAVs are collusive/non-collusive, we
propose joint SU scheduling, power and time allocation algo-
rithms based on the dual optimization method and the BCD
method to maximize the SU ergodic rate under the PU secrecy
constraint. In addition, we also propose more PU favorable
greedy algorithms aimed at minimizing the PU secrecy outage
probability. For the more practical unknown EAVs’ CSI case,
we furthermore propose an efficient algorithm for the SUs to
improve the PU security performance.
Extensive simulations show that increasing the number of
SUs is beneficial to both the SU and the PU, and increasing
the number of EAVs degrades the PU security performance
while actually improves the SU performance. It is also shown
that, compared to non-collusive EAVs, collusive EAVs are
more harmful to the PU while actually are more beneficial
to the SUs. Besides, it is shown that with unknown EAVs’
CSI, the SU performance is significantly degraded while the
PU security performance can still be improved significantly
by the proposed algorithm.
There are some possible extensions for the work in this
paper. First, we have considered a single primary commu-
nication link in this paper, while it would be interesting to
extend the results to support multiple primary links. In such
a case, the SUs shall comply with the PU secrecy constraints
for multiple primary communications links and the resource
allocation shall achieve a balance among the requirements
of different primary communication links. Second, we have
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the number of EAVs ( ).
considered that both the SU and the EAV are equipped with a
single antenna, while equipping multiple antennas can enhance
the performance of the SU and the EAV. In such a case,
multiple antennas at the SU can let the SU interfere with
the EAV more efficiently using beamforming technologies,
while multiple antennas at the EAV can let the EAV eavesdrop
the primary communication more conveniently using diversity
combining technologies, and thus extending the results to this
case is also interesting.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Suppose that denote the opti-
mal solution to P1 that satisfies
Then, we consider another solution
that satisfies
where The
value of is chosen such that
It can be easily seen that all the constraints of P1 are
still satisfied by . Thus, the so-
lution is a feasible solution to
P1. It can be seen that both and
achieve the same objective func-
tion in (12). This means that is also
an optimal solution to P1 and thus the optimal solution to P1
can always use up all the available transmit power of the PU.
This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Suppose that is the optimal so-
lution to P1 that satisfies Then, we con-
struct another solution that satisfies
where The value of is chosen such
that It can be easily verified that all the
constraints of P1 still hold for .
Thus, is a feasible solution to P1.
Since the values of the
objective function in (12) achieved by the two solutions are the
same. This means that the optimal solution to P1 can always
use up all the available unit time. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
After a few mathematical manipulations, the inequality
can be rewritten as
(71)
where Then,
we can make the following discussions on the value of
:
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Case 1: In this case, the inequality
is reformulated as Thus
equals to if the inequality
holds and equals to otherwise.
Case 2: In this case, considering the fact that
, the inequality cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, equals to .
Let denote the optimal solution to the inner maximization
problem in (38) for a given . Based on the above
discussions, we can make discussions on as:
Case 1: In this case, we discuss the value of
in two subcases. In the subcase of , the value
of equals to under the constraint
(39), and thus . In the subcase of ,
the value is the critical value of over which
the value of changes from to
under the constraint (39). Thus the inner maximization
problem in (38) is maximized at two possible points as
given by
(72)
Case 2: In this case, since
equals to under the constraint
(39), we can easily have
The above discussions lead to the expression of given by
(73)
Therefore, the optimal solution of the problem in (38) is
given by where
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Thus, in what follows, we focus on solving the inner
maximization problem in (57). For a given after a few
mathematical manipulations, the inequality can be
rewritten as where
and are given by (60), (64) and (65), respectively. Clearly,
Then, we can make the following observations on
the value of :
Case 1: In this case, the inequality
cannot be satisfied and
thus we have .
Case 2: In this case, the inequality
is satisfied only if
. Thus we have if and
otherwise.
Case 3: In this case,
the inequality is
satisfied only if where
and
Thus, we have if
and otherwise.
Based on the above discussions on for a given
the optimal solution of the inner maximization problem in
(57), , is discussed in the following three cases:
Case 1: In this case,
and thus the objective function be-
comes Therefore, it is easy to check that
due to the fact that is an increasing
function of
Case 2: In this case, we have
only if Considering the
constraint if or
, the objective function in (57) becomes
and thus . Otherwise, under the condition
the objective function in (57) is
if and is if
Therefore, assuming that we have
if and
otherwise. In summary, we have
(74)
Case 3: In this case, we have
only if Considering
the constraint the value of is discussed
in the following five subcases.
– Subcase 1: or . In this
subcase, the objective function in (57) becomes
and thus we have
– Subcase 2: , In this
subcase, the objective function in (57) is if
and is if
Therefore, since is an increasing function
of the maximum value of the objective function
in (57) is attained at or as given by
(75)
– Subcase 3: , In this subcase,
the objective function in (57) is and thus the
maximum value of the objective function is attained
at
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– Subcase 4: In this subcase,
the objective function in (57) is if
and is if
or Therefore, since is an
increasing function of the maximum value of the
objective function in (57) is attained at or
as given by
(76)
– Subcase 5: In this
subcase, the objective function in (57) is if
and is if
Thus, the maximum value of the objective
function is attained at
Based on the above discussions, the optimal solution of
the inner maximization problem in (57), , is summa-
rized by expression (59). Then, the optimal solution of the
problem in (57) is given by where
This completes the proof.
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